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Abstract— In a proxy signature scheme, a user delegates
his/her signing capability to another user in such a way that
the latter can sign messages on behalf of the former. In this
paper, we propose an efficient and secure proxy signature
scheme with multiple original signers. Our scheme is suitable for
wireless electronic commerce applications, since the overheads
of computation and communication are low. As an example,
we present an electronic air ticket booking scheme for wireless
customers.
Keywords: proxy signature, digital signature, e-commerce,
wireless communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a proxy signature scheme, one user Alice, called original
signer, delegates her signing capability to another user Bob,
called proxy signer. After that, the proxy signer Bob can sign
messages on behalf of the original signer Alice. Upon receiv-
ing a proxy signature on some message, a verifier not only
can validate its correctness by a given verification procedure,
but also be convinced of the original signer’s agreement on the
signed message. Proxy signature schemes have been suggested
for use in a number of applications, including mobile agent,
mobile communications, electronic commerce, and distributed
shared object systems etc. [2], [6], [12], [17].
Mambo, Usuda, and Okamoto firstly introduced the concept
of proxy signatures and proposed several constructions in [9],
[10]. Based on the delegation type, they classified proxy sig-
natures into full delegation, partial delegation, and delegation
by warrant schemes. In a full delegation, Alice’s secret key is
given to Bob directly so Bob has the same signing capability
as Alice. For most of real-world settings, such schemes are
obviously impractical and insecure. In a partial delegation
scheme, a proxy signer possesses a new key, called proxy
secret key, which is different from Alice’s secret key. So, proxy
signatures generated by using proxy secret key are different
from Alice’s standard signatures. However, in such schemes
the range of messages a proxy signer can sign is not limited.
This weakness is eliminated in delegation by warrant schemes
by adding a warrant that specifies the types of messages to
be delegated, the identities of Alice and Bob, the delegation
period, etc.
According to another criterion – whether the original signer
knows the proxy secret key, proxy signatures can be classified
into proxy-unprotected and proxy-protected schemes. That is,
in a proxy-protected scheme only proxy signer can generate
proxy signatures, while in a proxy-unprotected scheme either
proxy signer or original signer can generate proxy signatures
since both of them know the proxy secret key. In many
practical applications, proxy-protected schemes are required to
avoid potential disputes between the original signer and proxy
signer. Aiming to distinguish the rights and responsibilities of
both parties clearly, the proxy-protected schemes with partial
delegation by warrant have attracted much more investigations
than others. Sometimes, this special type of schemes is refer-
eed to proxy signature scheme for simplicity.
Following Mambo et al.’s first work in [9], [10], a number
of new schemes and improvements have been proposed [5],
[20], [6], [7], [4]; however, most of them do not fully meet the
desired security requirements (see Section 2.2). In [5], Kim et
al. introduced the concept of partial delegation by warrant, and
proposed a threshold proxy signature, in which the original
signer’s signing ability is shared among a delegated group
of n proxy singers such that only t or more of them can
generate proxy signatures cooperatively. However, Sun et al.
[16] pointed out that the discrete log based threshold proxy
signatures proposed in [5], [20] are insecure, and Wang et
al. [18] analyzed the RSA-based threshold proxy signature
by Hwang et al. [4]. In [6], Lee, Kim and Kim constructed
mobile agents for electronic commerce applications from non-
designated proxy signature, in which a warrant does not
specify the identity of a proxy signer so any possible proxy
signer may respond this delegation and become a proxy signer.
In [7], Lee, Cheon, and Kim investigated whether a secure
channel for delivery of a signed warrant is necessary in
existing schemes. Their results show that if secure channels
are not provided, the schemes in [9], [6] are insecure. To
avoid the usage of secure channels and overcome some other
weaknesses, some improved schemes are presented. But Wang
et al. [17] showed that all of the schemes and improvements
proposed in [6], [7] are insecure by demonstrating several
kinds of attacks. Boldyreva et al. [2] presented a formal model
for proxy signature, i.e., the existential unforgeablity against
adaptive chosen-message attacks [3].
Note that Wang et al.’s attacks in [17] mainly result from
the fact that a valid proxy key pair colud be forged by an
adversary, including the original signer and the proxy signer.
Wang proposed a new proxy signature scheme in [19], which
is based on the two-party Schnorr signature scheme of Nicolosi
et al. [11]. This scheme is provably secure and as efficient as
the schemes in [6], [7], [2]. Furthermore, Wang extended this
basic scheme into two versions of designated-verifier proxy
signatures so that the validity of a proxy signature can be
checked only by the designated proxy signer.
In this paper, based on the standard proxy signature scheme
proposed in [19], we propose an efficient and secure proxy
signature scheme with multiple original signers. Our scheme
is suitable for wireless electronic commerce applications, since
the overheads of computation and communication are low. As
an example, we present an electronic air ticket booking scheme
for wireless customers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 introduces the computational assumption and security re-
quirements for proxy signatures. Section 3 briefly reviews
Wang’s proxy signature scheme based on two-party Schnorr
signature. Then, in Section 4, we extend this scheme into a
proxy signature scheme with multiple original signers, and
analyze its security and efficiency. Finally, Section 5 discusses
some potential applications of a proxy signature scheme with
multiple original signers.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Computational Assumption
The proxy signature schemes in this paper are based on the
following computational assumption.
Assumption 1: Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption. Let
Gq = 〈g〉 be a cyclic multiplicative group generated by g
of order q. Then, on inputs (g, gx) ∈ G2q where x ∈R Zq
is a random (unknown) number, there is no probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm that outputs the value of x with
non-negligible probability.
The DL assumption is widely believed to be true for many
cyclic groups, such as the multiplicative subgroup Gq = 〈g〉 of
the finite field Zp, where p is a large prime and q is a prime
factor of p − 1. In practice, |p| = 1024 and |q| = 160 are
considered to be suitable for most current security applications.
B. Definitions
Definition 1. A proxy signature scheme is usually comprised
of the following procedures [19]:
• System Setup: On input of a security parameter l, this
probabilistic algorithm outputs two secret/public key pairs
(xA, yA) and (xB , yB) for the original signer Alice and
the proxy signer Bob. Note that those key pairs may be
used in a standard signature scheme at the same time.
• Proxy Key Generation: The original signer Alice and
the proxy signer Bob execute this interactive randomized
algorithm to generate a proxy key pair (xP , yP ) for Bob,
such that only Bob knows the value of xP , while yP is
public or publicly recoverable.
• Proxy Signature Generation: The proxy signer Bob runs
this (possibly probabilistic) algorithm to generate a proxy
signature σ for a message m by using the proxy secret
key xP .
• Proxy Signature Verification: A verifier runs this de-
terministic algorithm to check whether an alleged proxy
signature σ for a message m is valid with respect to a
specific original signer and a proxy signer.
The security requirements for proxy signature are first
specified in [9], [10], and later are kept almost the same beside
being enhanced in [6], and formalized in [2].
Definition 2. A secure proxy signature scheme should satisfy
the following requirements:
• Verifiability: From the proxy signature, a verifier can be
convinced of the original signer’s agreement on the signed
message.
• Identifiability: Anyone can determine the identities of
the corresponding original signer and proxy signer from
a proxy signature.
• Unforgeability: Only the designated proxy signer can
create a valid proxy signature on behalf of the original
signer. In other words, the original signer and other third
parties who are not designated as proxy signers cannot
create a valid proxy signature.
• Undeniability: Once a proxy signer creates a valid proxy
signature on behalf of an original signer, he cannot
repudiate the signature creation against anyone else.
• Prevention of misuse: The proxy signer cannot use the
proxy secret key for purposes other than generating valid
proxy signatures. In case of misuse, the responsibility of
the proxy signer should be determined explicitly.
III. PROXY SIGNATURE SCHEME BASED ON
TWO-PARTY SCHNORR SIGNATURE
In this section, we review the proxy signature scheme
proposed in [19], which is based on the provably secure two-
party Schnorr signature scheme of Nicolosi et al. [11]. The
basic idea is that Nicolosi et al.’s scheme is used to generate
a proxy key pair (xP , yP ) such that
gxP = yP = (yA · yB)h(mw,rP ) · rP mod p, (1)
where rP is a public value, and mw is a warrant which
specifies the related information about a proxy delegation.
In fact, (rP , xP ) is exactly a two-party Schnorr signature on
message mw. The point is that only Bob knows the value of
xP , but (rP , xP ) can only be generated by Alice and Bob
jointly. Therefore, xP can be used as the proxy secret key to
generate proxy signatures according to a standard DLP-based
signature scheme. At the same time, a verifier can validate
proxy signatures after recovering the public proxy key yP from
Eq. (1).
System Setup: Let p and q be two large primes such that
q|(p − 1), and g ∈ Z∗p a generator of order q. Denote Gq =
〈g〉. The discrete logarithm assumption holds in Gq. Hereafter,
we call three such integers (p, q, g) a DLP-triple. Let h(·)
and h′(·) be two secure cryptographic hash functions. It is
assumed that Alice and Bob have agreed on a warrant mw
before generating a proxy key pair for Bob. In addition, Alice
has her key pair (xA, yA = gxA mod p), and Bob has his key
pair (xB , yB = gxB mod p) 1.
Proxy Key Generation: To generate a proxy key pair
(xP , yP ) for the proxy signer Bob, Alice and Bob execute
the following interactive protocol jointly.
(1) Alice picks a random number kA ∈R Z∗q , computes rA =
gkA mod p and c = h′(rA), and then sends c to Bob.
(2) Similarly, Bob chooses a random number kB ∈R Z∗q ,
computes rB = gkB mod p, and replies Alice with
(c, rB).
(3) When (c, rB) is received, Alice checks whether rqB ≡
1 mod p. If the validation goes through, she computes
rP = rA · rB mod p, sA = kA + xA · h(mw, rP ) mod q,
and sends the pair (rA, sA) to Bob.
(4) Upon receiving (rA, sA), Bob first computes rP = rA ·
rB mod p, and then checks whether rqA ≡ 1 mod p, c ≡
h′(rA), and gsA ≡ yh(mw,rP )A ·rA mod p. If all validations
pass, he calculates sB = kB + xB · h(mw, rP ) mod q,
and finally sets his proxy key pair (xP , yP ) by
xP = sA + sB mod q, and yP = gxP mod p. (2)
It is easy to know that the above defined proxy key pair
(xP , yP ) satisfies Eq. (1), i.e., (rP , xP ) is a standard Schnorr
signature [15] on the warrant mw with respect to the public
key yA · yB mod p.
Proxy Signature Generation: To generate a proxy signature
on a message m that conforms to the warrant mw, the proxy
signer Bob performs the same operations as in the standard
Schnorr signature scheme [15]. That is, he first selects a
random number k ∈ Z∗q , computes r = gk mod p and
s = k+xP ·h(m,mw, r) mod q. The resulting proxy signature
on message m is σ = (mw, rP , r, s).
Proxy Signature Verification: To verify the validity of σ, a
verifier operates as follows.
(1) Check whether the message m conforms to the warrant
mw. If not, stop. Otherwise, continue.
(2) Check whether Alice and Bob are specified as the original
signer and the proxy signer in the warrant mw, respec-
tively.
(3) Recover the proxy public key yP by computing yP =
(yA · yB)h(mw,rP ) · rP mod p.
(4) Accept the proxy signature σ if the following equation
holds:
gs = yh(m,mw,r)P · r mod p. (3)
In the above scheme, Nicolosi et al.’s two-party Schnorr
signature scheme [11] is used to generate proxy key pair
1Here, we assume that each user’s key pair is certified by a certification
authority (CA). That is, when a user registers a public key with the CA, he/she
has to show the knowledge of the corresponding secret key. Actually, this is
a recommended practice for issuing public key certificates, and can be used
to prevent rogue-key attacks [2].
(xP , yP ). Therefore, from the provable security of Nicolosi et
al.’s scheme, it is known that a valid proxy key pair (xP , yP )
(defined by Eq. (1)) can only be generated by the original
signer Alice and the proxy signer Bob jointly. In other words,
anybody (including Alice and Bob) cannot generate a valid
proxy key pair independently. On the other hand, without
a valid proxy key pair anybody cannot generate a proxy
signature such that Eq. (3) is satisfied. This is because the
proxy signature generation algorithm is exactly the Schnorr
scheme [15], which is also provably secure [13] in the random
oracle model [1]. Therefore, Wang concluded that the above
proxy signature scheme is secure, as stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 [19]. Based on the results in [13] and [11], the
above proxy signature scheme is secure in the random oracle
model, under the assumption that the discrete log problem in
the multiplicative subgroup 〈g〉 is intractable.
IV. PROXY SIGNATURE SCHEME WITH MULTIPLE
ORIGINAL SIGNERS
In this section, we present a new proxy signature scheme
with multiple original signers. The basic idea is that we
first extend the provably secure two-party Schnorr signature
scheme [11] into (n + 1)-party setting, and then use the
resulting scheme to generate a proxy key pair. We assume
that the proxy signer Bob has public key yB , and each of n
original signers has certified public key yj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n. For
simplicity, we denote the proxy signer Bob as the user U0 and
let x0 = xB , y0 = yB .
A. Description of the Proposed Scheme
System Setup: (p, q, g) is a DLP-triple, and (xi, yi =
gxi mod p) is user Ui’s certified key pair, for each i ∈
{0, 1, · · · , n}. The warrant mw specifies the types of messages
to be delegated, the delegation period, all identities of n
original signers and the proxy signer Bob (i.e., user U0), and
other related information. Other notations are the same as in
previous section.
Proxy Key Generation: To generate a proxy key pair
(xP , yP ) for Bob, n original signers and the proxy signer Bob
execute the following interactive protocol cooperatively.
(1) Each user Ui (0 ≤ i ≤ n) picks a random number ki ∈R
Z∗q , computes ri = gki mod p and ci = h′(ri), and then
broadcasts ci.
(2) Each user Ui reveals the value of ri, 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Then,
each user checks whether all ri’s are correct, i.e., rqi ≡
1 mod p and ci ≡ h′(ri), for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n. If all
validations go through, continue; otherwise, stop.
(3) Each original singer Uj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) computes rP =
r0r1 · · · rn mod p, sj = kj + xj · h(mw, rP ) mod q, and
sends the pair (rj , sj) to Bob.
(4) Upon receiving (rj , sj), Bob first computes rP =
r0r1 · · · rn mod p, and then checks whether gsj ≡
y
h(mw,rP )
j · rj mod p, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. If all validations pass,
he calculates sB = k0 + xB · h(mw, rP ) mod q, and
finally sets his proxy key pair (xP , yP ) by
xP = sB+s1+· · ·+sn mod q, yP = gxP mod p. (4)
In fact, (rP , xP ) is exactly an (n+1)-party Schnorr signa-
ture on message mw with respect to the public key yBy1 · · · yn.
The point is that only the proxy signer Bob knows the proxy
secret key xP , but (rP , xP ) needs to be generated by the n
original signers and the proxy signer Bob jointly.
Proxy Signature Generation: To generate a proxy signature
on a message m that conforms to the warrant mw, the proxy
signer Bob performs the same operations as in the standard
Schnorr signature scheme [15]. That is, he first selects a
random number k ∈ Z∗q , computes r = gk mod p and
s = k+xP ·h(m,mw, r) mod q. The resulting proxy signature
on message m is σ = (mw, rP , r, s).
Proxy Signature Verification: To verify the validity of σ, a
verifier operates as follows.
(1) Check whether the message m conforms to the warrant
mw. If not, stop. Otherwise, continue.
(2) Check whether the delegation period expires. If not,
continue.
(3) Check whether each user j (j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}) is spec-
ified as the original signer, and Bob is specified as the
proxy signer in the warrant mw.
(4) Recover the proxy public key yP by computing
yP = (yBy1 · · · yn)h(mw,rP ) · rP mod p. (5)
(5) Accept the proxy signature σ if the following equation
holds:
gs = yh(m,mw,r)P · r mod p. (6)
B. Discussion
It is not difficult to directly verify the correctness of the
above proxy signature scheme with multiple original signers.
We now discuss its efficiency and security.
The proposed scheme is efficient. Firstly, note that the
procedure of proxy key pair generation needs to be executed
only once for a sufficiently long period, for example, one
year, though it is complicated a little. Secondly, to generate a
proxy signature, only one modular exponentiation is needed.
Thirdly, to enhance the performance equations (5) and (6) can
be checked together as a single equation. That is, a verifier
only needs to check the following equation:
gs · (yBy1 · · · yn)−h1·h2 · r−h2P ≡ r mod p, (7)
where h1 = h(mw, rP ) and h2 = h(m,mw, r). So the left
side of Eq. (7) can be carried out in 1.25 modular exponen-
tiations by means of an exponent array (pages 618 of [8]).
Moreover, note that a modular exponentiation with exponent
of size 160 bits requires about 240 modular multiplications.
Therefore, a proxy signature can be generated and verified by
240 and 300 modular multiplications, respectively.
About the security of the proposed scheme, we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under the discrete logarithm assumption, our
proxy signature scheme with multiple original signers is secure
in the random oracle model.
Proof: Firstly, we claim that in our scheme even n users
collude together, they cannot forge a valid proxy key pair
(xP , yP ) satisfying Eq. (5) and yP = gxP mod p. If this is
not the fact, i.e., there is an adversary A that can forge a valid
proxy key pair in the scheme with multiple original signers,
then from A we can construct a new adversary A′ that forges a
valid proxy key pair in the basic proxy signature scheme. More
specifically, A′ can be constructed as follows. For a given
public key pair (yA, yB), we first choose an index i ∈R [1, n]
and a number a ∈R Z∗q at random, and set xi = xA+a mod q,
yi = yA · ga mod p. Then, for each index 1 ≤ j ≤ n
and j 6= i, we select random numbers xj ∈R Z∗q such that
−a = ∑1≤j≤n,j 6=i xj mod q, and set yj = gxj mod p. So
we have yAyB = yBy1 · · · yn mod p. Finally, we feed on the
adversary A by input (yB , y1, · · · , yn). Consequently, when
A outputs a valid proxy key pair (xP , yP ), (xP , yP ) is also a
valid proxy key pair in the basic scheme with respect to the
original signer Alice and the proxy singer Bob. In addition, any
adversary (including the original signers) cannot forge valid
proxy signatures in the name of the proxy signer Bob, since the
provably secure Schnorr signature is used to generate proxy
signatures. Therefore, the proposed proxy signature scheme
with multiple original signers is unforgeable. At the same time,
other security requirements are also met, since the discussion
in [6] can be adapted to our scheme.
V. APPLICATIONS
We now present an application of the above proxy signature
scheme with multiple original signers as follows. Assume
customer Cindy gets her electronic air ticket from a ticket
agent Bob. To guarantee the integrity, authenticity and non-
repudiation of e-tickets, some signatures on e-tickets are
necessarily to be attached. Usually, Bob’s signature is not
sufficient to meet those security requirements since Cindy may
not have much confidence in the credit of the agent Bob. At
the same time, requiring signatures from both agent Bob and
the air company is not convenient in practice. The reason is
that to reduce cost, an air company may unlikely provide
on-line service for every booked or paid e-ticket. In such a
case, we can exploit a proxy signature scheme with multiple
original signers. That is, multiple air companies first delegate
their powers of issuing air tickets to a number of e-ticket
agents. After that, each designated agent can issue e-tickets
to costumers on behalf of those air companies. When the
costumer Cindy gets an e-ticket companied with valid proxy
signature from an agent Bob, she believes that not only Bob
is certified by those air companies, but also Bob and those
air companies will take the corresponding responsibilities if
there is any dispute on the e-ticket. Furthermore, it is very
convenient for the the e-ticket agent Bob since he only needs
to store one proxy secret key for all air companies. In addition,
a customer can verify the proxy signature on an e-ticket by
using a wireless device which has lower computational power,
such as a mobile phone. The reason is that in our scheme,
to generate and verify a proxy signature only 240 and 300
modular multiplications are needed, as we discussed earlier.
It is also possible to use proxy signatures with multiple
original signers in some other applications, such as mobile
agent in e-commerce settings.
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